Incompatibilism

Uhrwerkszerlegung 01 GW 02

Schopenhauer

Incompatibilism is the philosophical view that free will and determinism are logically incompatible categories and that the existence of one necessarily negates the possibility of the other. This standpoint is contrasted with compatibilism, which argues that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive.

Overview

Incompatibilism holds that if determinism is true, then our actions are controlled by external forces outside of our control, and thus, we cannot act freely. Conversely, if we can act freely, it implies that our actions are not predetermined, challenging the concept of determinism. This debate is central to discussions on free will, ethics, morality, and law, impacting theories of responsibility and accountability.

Types of Incompatibilism

Incompatibilism is divided into two main categories: hard determinism and libertarianism about free will.

Hard Determinism

Hard determinism asserts that determinism is true, and therefore, free will does not exist. It suggests that all events, including human actions, are the result of preceding causes. This view negates the possibility of moral responsibility, as individuals are not the ultimate originators of their actions.

Libertarianism

Libertarianism about free will argues that free will exists and determinism is false. It posits that individuals have the capacity to make free choices, independent of causal determinism. Libertarians often appeal to non-physical origins of decisions, such as the soul or uncaused actions, to explain free will.

Arguments for Incompatibilism

Incompatibilists argue that if determinism were true, every action would be predictable based on prior states of the world, leaving no room for free will. They also contend that moral responsibility requires free will, as individuals can only be held accountable for actions that are freely chosen.

Criticism

Critics of incompatibilism, mainly compatibilists, argue that free will can be understood as the ability to act according to one's desires and motivations, without the need for actions to be uncaused or undetermined. They suggest that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility, as it is possible to act freely even if those actions are determined by prior states.

Conclusion

Incompatibilism remains a significant stance within the philosophical debate on free will and determinism. Its implications extend beyond philosophy, influencing perspectives on criminal justice, ethics, and personal responsibility. The ongoing debate between incompatibilists and compatibilists highlights the complexity of understanding human freedom and moral accountability.