Emotivism

Philosophical theory of ethics

Template:Philosophy of ethics

Emotivism is a meta-ethical view that claims that ethical sentences do not express propositions but emotional attitudes. Hence, it is colloquially known as the "boo/hurrah" theory. Emotivism is a form of non-cognitivism or expressivism. It stands in contrast to other forms of non-cognitivism, such as prescriptivism, as well as to all forms of cognitivism, including both moral realism and ethical subjectivism.

History

Emotivism emerged in the early 20th century, influenced by the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle. The theory was notably advanced by A.J. Ayer in his book Language, Truth, and Logic (1936) and by Charles Stevenson in Ethics and Language (1944). These philosophers argued that moral language is not about stating facts but about expressing feelings and attitudes.

Theory

According to emotivism, when we make moral judgments, we are not stating facts but rather expressing our emotions. For example, when someone says, "Stealing is wrong," they are not describing a property of stealing but are expressing their disapproval of it. This view suggests that moral disagreements are not about facts but about differing emotional responses.

Emotivism is often associated with the verification principle, which holds that a statement is only meaningful if it can be empirically verified or is tautological. Since moral statements cannot be empirically verified, emotivists argue that they are not factual but expressive.

Criticisms

Emotivism has faced several criticisms. One major criticism is that it seems to undermine the possibility of moral reasoning and debate. If moral statements are merely expressions of emotion, it is unclear how one can argue about moral issues or persuade others to change their views.

Another criticism is that emotivism cannot account for the apparent objectivity of moral claims. People often speak as if moral statements are true or false, not just expressions of personal feelings.

Influence

Despite criticisms, emotivism has been influential in the development of other ethical theories, such as quasi-realism and expressivism. These theories attempt to account for the expressive function of moral language while addressing some of the shortcomings of emotivism.

See also

• Moral relativism
• Ethical naturalism
• Moral nihilism
• Cognitivism (ethics)

References

• Ayer, A.J. Language, Truth, and Logic. London: Gollancz, 1936.
• Stevenson, Charles. Ethics and Language. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944.